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Abstract
The basis of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) is the exchange of data between entities, and making a decision on
received data/event is usually based on information provided by other entities. Many researchers utilize the concept
of trust to assess the trustworthiness of the received data. Nevertheless, the lack of a review to sum up the best
available research on specific questions on trust management in vehicular ad hoc networks is sensible. This paper
presents a systematic literature review to provide comprehensive and unbiased information about various current
trust conceptions, proposals, problems, and solutions in VANETs to increase quality of data in transportation. For the
purpose of the writing of this paper, a total of 111 articles related to the trust model in VANETs published between
2005 and 2014 were extracted from the most relevant scientific sources (IEEE Computer Society, ACM Digital Library,
Springer Link, Science Direct, and Wiley Online Library). Finally, ten articles were eventually analyzed due to several
reasons such as relevancy and comprehensiveness of discussion presented in the articles. Using the systematic
method of review, this paper succeeds to reveal the main challenges and requirements for trust in VANETs and future
research within this scope.
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1 Review
1.1 Introduction
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are a class of
ad hoc networks that consist of vehicles and roadside
units (RSUs). VANETs were originally created to enhance
safety on the road using cooperative collision warning
via vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2I) communication. In V2V communication, vehicles
send and receive messages to and from one another. These
messages can alert signals about road congestion, acci-
dents ahead, or information about traffic on a given route.
V2I communication takes place between nodes and road-
side infrastructure and involves finding the nearest cheap-
est gas station, internet services, online toll payment,
etc.
According to [1], the applications in VANETs are cate-
gorized into safety and non-safety applications. The basis
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of these applications is the exchange of data among enti-
ties. Therefore, due to the lack of centralized services
as well as the open, distributed, and dynamic nature of
VANETs [2], many attacks like denial of service, message
suppression, and propagation of false message can affect
the performance of applications.
In order to overcome these threats and increase secu-
rity, several concepts have been proposed by researchers.
Wei and Chen [3] stated that authentication is onemethod
for ensuring the integrity of transmitted messages. In
[4], the reputation of a vehicle is introduced to evaluate
the reliability of received data. Dotzer et al. also stated
that a common method to deal with the safety threats
in VANETs is to establish trust relationships and detect
selfish and malicious entities [5].
Security is one of the main issues in VANETs, and trust
is a key element of security [6]. Hence, since VANETs
are based upon data exchange among vehicles, trustwor-
thiness of data is of great importance. In addition, data
communication between trusted vehicles directly affects
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security. Moreover, the quality of safety/non-safety appli-
cations in VANETs largely depends upon the trustworthi-
ness of data [7], and trust plays a vital role in the security
and quality of a vehicular network. Thereby, comprehen-
sive studies on trust and reviewing existing trust models
are necessary. However, the lack of a review on trust in
VANETs to sum up the best available research on specific
questions is sensible, which must be done by synthesizing
the results of existing studies.
This study conducts a systematic literature review (SLR)
of current research that aim at managing trust on vehic-
ular ad hoc networks. The present study investigates the
existing trust models published between 2005 and 2014
and extracts the advantages and weaknesses of the pro-
posed trust models. The process of trust measurement
in each model along with the relevant flowchart is also
described. In addition, this study exploits trust metrics
and properties of the trust model. As a result, based on
the existing problems and gaps in the proposed models, a
new framework to develop an intelligence trust model in
VANETs is proposed.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way:
Section 1.2 discusses the research methodology in this
review. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 present the definition of trust
and trust management in VANETs, respectively. In addi-
tion, in Section 1.4, we present some of the existing trust
models. Section 1.5 presents the trust metric. Section 1.6
describes the comparison of proposed trust models and
also presents our framework. Section 2 concludes the
review.
1.2 Research methodology
Two main methods of review articles are commonly
found in the scientific literature: systematic and narra-
tive review of the literature. A narrative review describes
and discusses the state of the science of a specific
topic from a theoretical and contextual point of view
[8]. A systematic literature review provides a means of
identifying, evaluating, and interpreting the literature
relevant to a particular research question or topic
area [9].
To provide comprehensive and unbiased information
on trust in VANETs, this study presents a systematic
literature review. There are five steps in conducting a
systematic review [10] which we are presenting briefly
next: (a) identification of resources, (b) selection of stud-
ies, (c) study quality assessment, (d) Data extraction and
monitoring progress, and (e) data synthesis. Further-
more, according to [9], the research question is 2 the
most important pre-review activity in SLR. In this study,
the research questions related to trust management in
VANETs are as follows:
• What are the methods used in the proposed trust
models?
• What are the trust metrics used to measure trust in
the existing trust model?
• What are the properties of the trust model?
1.2.1 Identification of resource
The first step towards resource identification is recog-
nizing the relevant keywords. For this purpose, we have
conducted a broad search on Google Scholar using ‘Trust
in VANET’ as keyword. The initial result shows that ‘rep-
utation’ is a common issue related with ‘Trust in VANET’.
Therefore, we refined the search for articles using ‘Repu-
tation and Trust in VANET’.
Based on both levels of keywords in the search, we have
found 98 articles. These articles are stored in LIST 1.
The detailed activity for searching articles is presented in
Figure 1.
• First level of keywords
– (Trust Management) and (VANET)
– (Trust Model) and (VANET)
• Second level of keywords
– (Reputation) and (VANET)
Figure 1 First step to extract articles based on keywords.
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Figure 2 Second step to extract articles based on the related work section.
In the second step, to reduce the likelihood of bias and to
find relevant new articles, we focused on the related work
section of existing articles in LIST 1. Based on this step, we
have found 13 new articles related to trust and reputation
in VANETs which are stored in LIST 2. The process of this
step is illustrated in Figure 2.
1.2.2 Selection of studies
Different methods of selection are proposed in the exist-
ing systematic review [11,12]. In this paper, we consider
several criteria as exclusion criteria for screening. Based
on these criteria, studies that were not clearly related to
the research questions will be excluded. These criteria
are related to publisher, year of publication, number of
citation, and so on. In the following, we describe them
in detail. Figure 3 also shows the detailed activity for
selection of studies.
• The first rule indicates that five databases - IEEE,
ACM, Springer, Science Direct, and Wiley - are
acceptable to find relevant studies in the field.
However, this study is not limited to these databases,
and few numbers of articles are selected from other
databases. The main condition to select articles from
other databases is the high number of citations.
• The second rule is related to the year of publication
of articles. For this purpose, the search is limited to
studies published between 2005 and 2014.
• The third rule is related to articles that were accepted
in a conference. For this purpose, we consider a
special condition to exclude or include articles that
were accepted in conferences. Based on this
condition, we exclude articles that have less number
of citations than the threshold (i.e., threshold = 10).
• In the process of searching for articles, we have found
that some papers have been duplicated. Therefore,
according to the fourth rule, we exclude the duplicate
articles.
1.2.3 Data extraction
In the data extraction and synthesis step, the key details
from the selected papers will be obtained. This work
divides data extraction into two groups:
(1) Methods, where the different methodological
approaches of trust in VANET are synthesized
(2) Demographics of the published works, e.g., the year
of publication
1.2.4 Data analysis
The data analysis extracts the terms and definitions used
in the FINAL LIST of selected papers. Therefore, we
focus on the existing trust models in the FINAL LIST and
extract the concepts that have been used in each model.
We summarize them and briefly describe each of them
in Table 1. In addition, we show the results of extract
execution in the following figures and tables.
Figure 3 Selection of final studies.
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Table 1 Important concepts in this review
Concept Description
Type of trust model Type of trust model in terms of the main
object
Trust metric Factors that are used to measure trust value
in each model
Trust model properties Properties that trust models have to satisfy
them
Table 2 shows the results of all steps as determined in a
summary of the studies selected in each stage of the selec-
tion procedure for each source. LIST 1 shows the results
which were obtained by running the search string on the
selected sources. The LIST 2 shows articles which were
selected based on the related work section. The last row
shows the number of final papers selected after the study
selection procedure.
Figure 4 illustrates the details of LIST 1 and LIST 2 that
present the number of publications in different databases
over a specific time period, between 2005 and 2014.
1.3 Trust
In computer science, as well as in the social sciences,
trust has many meanings [13,14]. Although definitions
and classifications of trust have been borrowed from the
social science literature, there is no clear consensus on
the definition of trust in computer networks [15]. Never-
theless, the researchers in the field of security in ad hoc
networks [16,17] utilized the concept of trust to improve
security. Yu et al. [18] and Yang and Sun [19] stated that
mechanisms of trust are the strategy to improve secu-
rity of MANET. In addition, Abdel-Hamid et al. in [20]
reported that trust is a key element of security in vehicu-
lar ad hoc networks. Liu et al. have mentioned that trust is
the belief that an entity has about other entities [15]. Due
to the importance of this concept in the security of ad hoc
networks and to enhance safety, we have collected some
of the existing definitions of trust in VANETs in Table 3.
1.4 Trust management
Due to the lack of centralized services in self-organized
systems, vehicular ad hoc networks cannot be secured by
the existing security solutions [21]. Therefore, researchers
have proposed different techniques to enhance security.
Gomez and Martinez [22] refer to trust and reputation
Table 2 Summary of studies selected at each stage of the
selection procedure
IEEE ACM Springer Science Direct Wiley Other Total
LIST 1 51 5 11 6 3 22 98
LIST 2 6 2 0 0 0 5 13
FINAL LIST 5 0 2 1 1 1 10
management in distributed networks as a novel and origi-
nal way to address and tackle some of those not yet solved
threats. Li et al. [23] introduced also the trust establish-
ment scheme in VANETs to help normal nodes make the
right choice and constrain the harmful behavior of bad
ones. Moreover, authors in [24] mentioned that trust-
worthy communication in vehicular ad hoc networks is
essential to provide a reliable traffic safety to improve the
efficiency of applications. Table 4 presents some defini-
tions of trust management proposed by researchers.
As mentioned above, trust management has become
a main method to ensure the security of vehicular ad
hoc networks, and trusted relation between vehicles is
the outcome of the trust establishment in VANET envi-
ronment [25]. Especially in critical applications like haz-
ard warning, a receiving node needs to ensure authen-
ticity and trust ability of received messages before
any reaction. In recent years, various models of trust
have been proposed in VANETs. For instance, Hong
et al. [26] described a novel trustmodel based on situation,
namely ‘SAT’. The goal of SAT is to build a new trustmodel
using architecture and cryptographic tools that provide
predictive trust information and quick and flexible key
management, thus improving driving experience. In [7],
a real-time message content validation (RMCV) scheme
is proposed, which is based on the information-oriented
trust model. It empowered each individual vehicle with
the capability of evaluating the trustworthiness of the
possibly large amount of messages received in VANETs,
without relying on any infrastructure support such as
roadside units or central servers. Huang et al. [27] stated
that almost all the existing reputation systems compute
trust value based on the past interactionwith target nodes.
They argue that due to the dynamic and open environ-
ment, this assumption is not valid in VANETs. In fact, if
a vehicle is communicating with another vehicle, it is not
guaranteed whether it will interact with the same vehicle
in the future. Therefore, the existing algorithms which are
based on the long-term relationship are not suitable for
VANETs. To solve this problem, they proposed a social
network approach for trust management in VANETs.
In general, based on the main object in model (data or
entity), the trust models in VANETs can be categorized
into three major groups as follows [28]: (i) entity-centric,
(ii) data-centric, and (iii) combined.
• Entity-centric: The entity is the main object in this
group, and the trust model focuses on the
trustworthiness of vehicles. To achieve this, the trust
model needs sufficient information about the
neighbors and sender of the message. But the high
mobility of vehicles leads to failure to collect enough
information about the neighbors/sender. In addition,
the correctness of data is another problem in this
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Figure 4 Number of publications over a specific time period.
group. When an entity received data from a
trustworthy sender, according to the presence of
attackers as well as limitation of sensors, data
correctness still remains obscure.
• Data-centric: The data/event message is the main
object in this group, and the trust model focuses on
the trustworthiness of data. In this group, the trust
model needs to assess the level of trust for each
received event message. Therefore, the large number
of data as well as duplicated data in heavy traffic
density leads to increased latency and lost data. In
contrast, in the sparse traffic density, this model
would not perform well [28].
• Combined : Both entity and data are the main objects
in this group. The trust model uses vehicle trust to
evaluate the trustworthiness of data [29].
Based on the method of selection that proposed in this
study, ten article are selected to review in more details.
Table 3 Definition of trust in VANETs
Study Definition
[15] The belief that an entity has about other entities, from past
experiences, on knowledge about the entity’s nature, and/or
on recommendations from trusted entities.
[44] Trust mechanisms not only help in node behavior detection,
but also improve network performance because honest nodes
can avoid working with untrustworthy nodes.
[36] Trust is a relation among entities that is established based on
the observations of historical interactions.
[20] Trust is the key element in creating a trusted vehicular
environment which promotes security in vehicular networks.
[45] A trust value is introduced in order to support the rating of
intersecting nodes as benign or malicious.
[46] Trust can be described as the expectation and belief about
future behavior, based on experiences and evidences collected
in the past, either direct or indirect.
[47] Trust describes the level to which an entity accepts the
dependence on another one.
We extracted the type of model based on the classifica-
tion mentioned above. In addition, we focused on trust
measurement and decision making applied in the selected
trust models in the FINAL LIST. Table 5 presents these
models along with the type, publisher, year of publication,
and number of citations. We also extracted the workflow
of proposed trust models. We exploited the trust metrics,
properties, and decision making methods that applied in
the proposed trust models.
1.4.1 Entity-based trust management
In the entity-oriented trust model, trustworthiness of
information is estimated based on the trustworthiness of
the message sender [7]. Minhas et al. [30] and Gomez
and Martinez [22] proposed two models of trust based on
entity.
To deal with selfish vehicles that try to maximize
a car owner’s utility by sending out false informa-
tion, Minhas et al. developed a framework that mod-
els the trustworthiness of the agents of other vehicles
Table 4 Trust management in other studies
Study Description
[33] Trust management is to determine whether the traffic event
reported by a warning message is really occurring and to
prevent false traffic warning messages from being spread on
VANET.
[22] Trust and reputation management has been proposed in the
last years as an accurate alternative to deal with some security
threats in highly distributed and dynamic scenarios.
[23] Trust management has become a main method to ensure the
security of VANETs.
[46] Trust management is to provide functional and reliable traffic
safety and efficiency applications.
[7] Trust management directly impacts the quality of the
applications.
[48] Trust management is important to secure the application’s
integrity and reliability.
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Table 5 Existing trust models in the FINAL LIST
Class Study Year Publisher Citation
Entity-based trust model [30] 2011 IEEE Journal 12
[22] 2012 Elsevier 20
Data-based trust model [31] 2008 IEEE Conference 178
[7] 2013 Springer 0
[32] 2013 Wiley 0
[33] 2010 IEEE Conference 12
[34] 2009 Hindawi 33
[35] 2011 IEEE Conference 10
Combined trust model [36] 2013 IEEE Journal 3
[37] 2012 Springer 0
[30]. This model considers a multifaceted trust model-
ing approach that incorporates role, experience, priority,
and majority-based trust. As shown in Figure 5, when an
agent/vehicle receives a few reports (s) that are relevant
to an event from different agents/vehicles (k), depend-
ing on the task, a number of agents (n) are chosen and
an ordered list of agents to ask is constructed. The exist-
ing agents/vehicles in the ordered list based on both
role-based and experience-based trust values will be pri-
oritized. Then, the agent attempts to send a request to
existing agents in the list and receives responses from
them. According to the time closeness, location close-
ness, experience-based trust, and role-based trust, the
aggregated effects of its report (ERj ) for each agent in the
ordered list will be calculated. To consider the effect of
all the different reports, the majority opinion (MRj ) which
is the report with maximum effect among all reports will
be obtained. Based on the aggregated effect, the majority
opinion, and the maximum error rate (ε), the agent will
decide on how to react on the report. If there is a major-
ity consensus on the response, then this response is taken
as the advice and is followed. Otherwise, the agent follows
the advice of an agent with the highest role and highest
experience trust value.
In order to quickly and accurately distinguish malicious
or selfish nodes that are spreading false or bogus mes-
sages throughout the network, an infrastructure-based
trust and reputation model, namely TRIP, is proposed in
[22]. This model computes reputation score based on the
recommendation given by other vehicles and RSUs. The
decision making in this model is based on fuzzy logic and
probability.
As shown in Figure 6, the reputation score of each vehi-
cle (vi) computes a trust score for other vehicles (vj) from
which it receives a message. To this end, TRIP considers
the recommendation given by the RSU (RecRSUj ), recom-
mendation given by other vehicles (Reckj ), and reputation
score at previous time (Rept−1ij ). The reputation score will
determine which trust level the vehicle is placed: TRUST,
NOT TRUST, or +/- TRUST. Moreover, this model con-
siders eachmessage as having a certain severity level: high,
medium, and low. Messages with high severity can be only
accepted when they were issued by vehicles placed in the
‘TRUST’ trust level, whereas medium and low severity
messages can be accepted from nodes which were given
either the ‘TRUST’ or ‘+/- TRUST’ level. The probabil-
ity of accepting a message sent by a vehicle which was
placed in the trust level ‘+/- TRUST’ will be calculated
using P+/−T .
1.4.2 Data-based trust management
The data-based trust model attempts to verify whether the
reported information is reliable or not. Based on the trust
value, the model decides how to react on the reported
event. A few models of trust based on data have been pro-
posed such as the data-centric, RMCV, intrusion-aware
trust model, reputation-based trust model, event-based
reputation system (ERS), and roadside-unit aided data-
centric trust establishment (RATE).
Raya et al. [31] proposed a framework for data-centric
trust establishment where trust in each individual piece of
data is computed. They proposed the collection of multi-
ple reports related to the same event and of their weights
and their combination into a robust decision scheme.
Thus, the reports along with their weights are passed to a
decision logic module. Figure 7 shows the process applied
in this trust model.
They mentioned that vehicles can become faulty or
compromised by attackers and hence need to be revoked.
In addition, the location and time of report generation
change fast and are important in assigning trustworthi-
ness values to events. To this end, they defined a secu-
rity status function (s(vk)) to determine legitimate and
revoked vehicles and dynamic trust metric functions that
indicate different node attributes that dynamically change.
For each attribute, a different metric is defined (μl). In
addition, in this model, vehicles are classified according to
a system-specific set of node types. The type of each vehi-
cle will be determined by (τ(vk)). Moreover, for all vehicle
types, there exists a trustworthiness ranking where the
trustworthiness ranking of each vehicle is different with
respect to a task. Therefore, based on the type of vehicle
and the type of event, the event-specific trustworthiness
function (f ) does differentiate among any two or more
nodes of the same type. Then, the trustworthiness of a
report (F(ejk)) will be computed based on security status,
dynamic trust metric, and event-specific trustworthiness.
Because it can be hard to decide whether the reported
event took place based on a single message, they proposed
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Figure 5 Multifaceted approach to modeling agent trust.
the collection of multiple reports related to the same event
and of their weights. At the end, the reports along with
their weights are passed to a decision logic module.
Gurung et al. [7] proposed an information-oriented
trust model that empowers each individual vehicle with
the capability of evaluating the trustworthiness of the
possibly large amount of messages received in VANETs,
without relying on any infrastructure support such as
roadside units or central servers. The proposed trust
model ‘RMCV’ considers several factors that have impact
on the trustworthiness of messages including message
content similarity, content conflict, and message rout-
ing path similarity. The RMCV scheme consists of two
main components: (i) message classification and (ii)
information-oriented trust model.
Message classification is to identify the messages
describing the same event from the potentially large
amount of received messages and to cluster these mes-
sages using clustering algorithms. In this model, a two-
level clustering algorithm is proposed. The first level
clustering groups messages describing the same event
regardless of the message content. The aim of the sec-
ond level clustering is to identify conflicting information
regarding the same event. The information-oriented trust
model is to determine which group of messages is telling
the truth. As shown in Figure 8, three important factors
affect message trustworthiness, which are content simi-
larity, content conflict, and routing path similarity. Based
on these factors, the trust score of each message will be
computed at the individual vehicle level.
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Figure 6 TRIP.
Given a group of messages associated with the same
event, similar messages are generally considered to be
supportive to one another. It is an important factor to
judge the trustworthiness of a message. To model these
two effects, two parameters are used: (i) maximum dis-
tance (maxDc) of the content between twomessages in the
same cluster and (ii) the number of messages (Nc) in the
cluster.
The path similarity serves as a penalty value to the
support value of a cluster of messages. The more simi-
lar the routing paths of messages in the same cluster, the
less support to each other will be considered. If similar
messages share more common nodes during their rout-
ing paths, the risk of messages being tampered increases.
Based on the model, three parameters affect routing path
similarity: the number of messages (Nc) in the cluster,
Figure 7 On data-centric trust establishment.
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Figure 8 RMCV.
the number of the origins of the messages (Nsrc), and the
number of distinct vehicles (Ndif) in the routing paths of
messages in the same cluster.
Authors mentioned that content conflict can negatively
affect the trustworthiness of messages and a higher con-
flicting value will be obtained if there are more messages
against the current cluster (Ci). Suppose that Ci, . . . ,Ck is
the clusters of messages regarding the same event and the
conflicting value (Conci ) is for each cluster of messages.
Shaikh and Alzahrani [32] stated that the existing trust
models that measure trust based on the history of inter-
actions are not suitable due to the ephemeral nature of
VANETs. To deal with this limitation, they proposed an
intrusion-aware trust model that works in three phases.
The first phase calculates the confidence value, and the
second phase calculates the trust value. The last phase
takes the decision on message.
According to Figure 9, the confidence value is based on
location closeness (Lc), time closeness (Tc), location ver-
ification (Lv), and time verification (Tv). To calculate the
trust value, the total number of sender nodes (nxk ) and
confidence value (Ci) of all the nodes that send a message
is required. The decision process comprises of two steps:
In the first step, the systemwill select the message that has
a higher trust value. The second step will accept that mes-
sage if the trust value of the selected message is greater
than the minimum acceptable threshold; otherwise, the
message will be discarded.
Ding et al. [33] proposed an event-based reputation
model to filter bogus warning messages. In this model,
vehicles have different roles, and based on this, a dynamic
role-dependent reputation evaluation mechanism is pre-
sented to determine whether an incoming traffic message
is significant and trustworthy to the driver. Reputation
functions are designed for these different roles: event
reporter, event observer and event participant. Each role
has its own reputation evaluation mechanism to deter-
mine whether an incoming traffic message is trusted.
As shown in Figure 10, the reputation value of event
in the event reporter (ER) will be calculated based on
the detection frequency and standard frequency for this
type of event. Based on the observing succeeding behav-
ior of ER, the event observer (EO) will calculate the
reputation value of event. By integrating data from EOs
and EPs, the reputation value of event will be calcu-
lated in the event participant (EP). At the end, if the
calculated value of the reputation is more than the pre-
defined threshold, the vehicle will send the event message
to all neighbors. Otherwise, the event message will be
denied.
To prevent the spread of false traffic warning messages,
Lo and Tsai [34] proposed an event-based reputation
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Figure 9 Intrusion-aware trust model.
system, namely, ‘ERS’. This model is composed of three
interfaces, four functionalities, and one repository for
table storage. The decision making is based on the event
reputation value and event confidence value. The event
reputation value (ER) defines the intensity degree of a
traffic event, and its initial value is always set to zero.
The event confidence value (EC) indicates the reliability
extent of a traffic event. Moreover, the event reputa-
tion threshold and event confidence threshold in an ERS
are dependent on the sensor capability of a vehicle and
Figure 10 Reputation-based trust model.
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the type characteristics of a traffic event. This model is
illustrated in Figure 11.
Based on the type of detection, by sensor or by other
vehicles, event reputation value collection and event con-
fidence list collection both have different reactions. It
means that when a vehicle detects an event with its on-
board sensors, the value is increased by one. On the other
hand, when a vehicle receives a traffic warning message
from another vehicle, the ERS adds the event reputation
value in the received message into the field of event repu-
tation value at the same event record in the event table or
creates a new event record in the event table.
When a given vehicle detects a traffic event by sen-
sor, the given ERS will append its vehicle’s identity into
the relevant field in the event confidence list at the
corresponding event entry. In contrast, when a vehicle
receives a traffic warning message from another vehicle,
the content of the event confidence list in the message
will be appended in the event confidence list field at the
corresponding event entry.
In addition, two important thresholds are introduced
in this model, namely, event reputation threshold (ERthld)
and event confidence threshold (ECthld). The configura-
tion of the event reputation threshold and event confi-
dence threshold is based on the event type and sensor
capability. When ERS detects that the event reputation
value and the event confidence value of a traffic event are
over the corresponding threshold, it means that the traffic
event really exists and is still there. Therefore, the ERS will
send this event information through the user interface to
notify the driver and at the same time broadcast a traffic
warning message with the current event reputation value
and the corresponding confidence list to nearby vehicles.
Lo and Tsai mentioned that some traffic safety applica-
tions actively send traffic revocation messages to inform
other vehicles when an event is resolved. Therefore, in
Figure 11 ERS.
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order to eliminate the weakness of the event message
revocation scheme, the reputation value adaptationmech-
anism is introduced in ERS. In this mechanism, two func-
tions to control the corresponding event reputation value
of a detected event during the event’s life time are uti-
lized so that the event status (resolved or not) is reflected
by its reputation value. The first function is the repu-
tation value suppression function which sets the event
reputation value of an event record as the event reputa-
tion threshold if the reputation value of this event record
is greater than the predefined reputation threshold. The
reputation value suppression function helps ERS to con-
trol the maximum value of the reputation measurement.
The second function is the reputation value degradation
function which is used to decrease the event reputation
value of an event record in the event table according to the
length of event lifetime.
Wu et al. [35] have also proposed an RSU-aided scheme
that is completely data-centric, namely, ‘RATE’. The trust
establishment, which is executed in RSUs, applied the ant
colony optimization algorithm. This model is based on the
observation and feedback factors. Upon the detection of
an event, vehicles generate observations and correspond-
ing confidence. The observation factor reflects recently
reporting frequency of the evidence, together with the
confidence of the observer on this piece of evidence and
the weight corresponding to reporter’s identity. Based on
all the confidence and weight, RATE calculates the obser-
vation factor. The feedback factor indicates the evidence’s
practically verified usefulness. The management of feed-
back consists of three stages: initialization, aging, and
promotion. Figure 12 shows the process of RATE.
Upon the reception of observation reports in RSU,
RATE puts them in the recently received observation list
(Lro). RSUs check the recent observation reports in (Lro)
and calculate the observation factor (η) for each piece of
evidence (Eji). The observation factor will be calculated













depends on the distance
from the vehicle to the event k (Dk), maximum detection
range of the vehicle (Dmax), the number of sensors that
can detect the event (Nk), and total number of sensors





depends on the type of vehicle. In order to
manage the membership of evidence, RATE also uses a
quantity threshold (T). Therefore, based on these factors,
the following processes will be performed:
• If (η ≥ T) and (Eji is not member of Le), add Eji into
Le and τinit = τmax.
• If(η ≥ T) and (Eji is already in Le), do nothing.• If (η < T) for evidence in Le, remove them from Le.
Figure 12 RATE.
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In the last step, based on the two factors (τ , η), the trust
level of evidence is re-calculated and appended to the evi-
dence. Moreover, RATE will decrease the feedback factor
(τ ) and will calculate the observation factor (η) of each
evidence in Le at regular intervals.
1.4.3 Combined based trust management
According to [28,36] in the combined based trust model,
data trust evaluation is performed using entity trust. The
combined trust model aims to determine trustworthiness
of the messages based on opinions provided by other
vehicles. The basic idea is to suggest a vehicle to trust
a message that has been evaluated to be trustworthy by
many other trusted peer vehicles [7].
Chen and Wei [36] proposed a beacon-based trust
management system namely ‘BTM’. It aims to thwart
internal attackers from sending false messages in privacy-
enhanced VANETs. The proposed model is a hybrid trust
management mechanism, which constructs entity trust
from beacon messages and computes data trust from
cross-checking the plausibility of event messages and bea-
con messages.
As shown in Figure 13, in order to compute entity
trust from beacon messages, cosine similarity is used to
compute similarity (Simcos) between the claimed posi-
tion, velocity, and direction with the estimated values. In
order to maintain the historical beacon-trust information
of neighboring vehicles, a time-based weighting method
is proposed to calculate the trustworthiness of beacon
messages (Tbea).
In this model, data trust depends on the direct event-
based trust (Tdevt) and indirect event-based trust (Tevt).
In order to compute the trustworthiness of a direct event-
based message, a position- and movement-verification
mechanism is proposed. By this mechanism, a receiv-
ing vehicle is able to evaluate the trustworthiness of the
sender vehicle by analyzing both the received event mes-
sages and the beaconmessages from a vehicle. To compute
the similarity between historical beacon messages and
received event messages, the Tanimoto coefficient is used.
On the other hand, in this model, when the message
receiver establishes trust relationships through the recom-
mendation of other vehicles, the trustworthiness between
the sender and receiver should not be more than the trust
value between the receiver and the forwarder (Topn), as
well as the trust value between the sender and the for-
warder. Therefore, based on this assumption, the indirect
event-based trust is computed by Equation (1):
Tevt = min(Topn,Tdevt) (1)
When a vehicle computes the event trust value Tevt,
it updates the previous reputation value in order to take
the historical event trust value into consideration. There-
fore, to compute the reputation value (Trep), the indirect
event trust value and the previous reputation value are
considered.
Figure 13 BTM.
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In the next step, based on Tbea, Tevt, and Trep, the
composite trustworthiness (Tcom) of the received event
message will be calculated. In addition, due to the fact
that vehicle receives a direct event message or an indirect
event message opinion transmitted from multiple vehi-
cles, it needs to combine the received opinions and then
to determine the overall trustworthiness (T supds ) of this
event message. In this model, to accommodate the nature
of uncertainty of VANETs, the Dempster-Shafer theory
(DST) is used for opinion combination. At the end, it will
make a decision according the threshold of trust degree
Tthld.
Wei and Chen [37] also proposed a RSU and beacon-
based trust management model, namely, ‘RaBTM’. This
model allows both OBUs and RSUs to construct entity
trust by cross-checking the plausibility of event mes-
sages and beaconmessages. The objective of the proposed
model is to prorogate message opinions quickly while
preventing internal attackers from sending or forwarding
forged messages in privacy-enhanced VANETs.
According to Figure 14, based on direct and indirect
event messages from other vehicles, RaBTM evaluates the
combined trust value (Tds) corresponding to the event.
To this end, DST is utilized as the evidence combination
method.
In addition, if a vehicle also receives the set of origi-
nal event message from RSUs (R), RaBTM will evaluate
the opinion confidence of RSUs (Orsu). Then, the overall
event trust value (Toval) will be evaluated based on Tds and
Orsu. In the last step, it will make a decision based on the
threshold of trust degree (Tthld).
1.5 Trust metric
An overview on the proposed trust models shows that
based on the objective of the trust model and intended
solution, different parameters are applied to measure
data/entity trust value. According to [38], these metrics
inherit the properties of trust. Therefore, the proper and
correct selection of metrics, to achieve the ultimate objec-
tives, is very important when designing and developing a
trust model.
Due to the importance of trust metrics, we re-examined
the proposed trust models in terms of parameters uti-
lized for measuring the trust value. Table 6 represents the
results of this review.
In order to determine the importance degree of each
metric, we summarize them in Table 7. Then, based on
this table, we analyzed these metrics in terms of repeti-
tion rate in the proposed trust models by Microsoft Excel.
The results of this assessment are illustrated in Figure 15.
According to this diagram, distance, time and recommen-
dation by other vehicles had the highest repetition rate
with 60%, 50%, and 50%, respectively. The number of
senders at 40% and the type of vehicle at 30% had the next-
highest repetition rate. Other parameters had the same
repetition rate of 20%. The definition of metrics are as
follows:
• Distance: refers to location closeness, distance from
vehicle to event, distance between the message
receiver and the message transmitter, distance
between sender and RSU, and distance between RSU
and event• Time: refers to time closeness, time delay between
the event message time-stamp and the receiver’s
current time-stamp, and transmission delay• Rec. by vehicle: refers to opinion of vehicle on
data/entity• Number of sender: refers to the number of origin
entity that create messages and the number of
transmitter entity• Type of vehicle: refers to different roles of vehicles on
VANETs
Figure 14 RaBTM.
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Table 6 Trust metric
Study Metric
Multifaceted approach Time closeness (Tc)
Location closeness (Lc)
Role-based trust value (Tr ) :
•Authority • Expert • Seniority • Ordinary
Experience-based trust value (Te): depends on the number of interaction
TRIP Direct previous experiences with the target node (Repij)
Recommendations from other surrounding vehicles (Reckj)
Recommendation from central authority through roadside units (RecRSUj)
Data-centric Dynamic trustworthiness factors, e.g., location and time (μl)
Event-specific trust (λj)
Security status (s(vk))
Type of vehicle ((vk))
RMCV Content similarity (supprt(c))
- Maximum distance of content between two messages in the same cluster
- Possible maximum distance - number of messages
Content conflict (Conc)
Route similarity (Pathc)
- Number of messages in the cluster
- Number of source providers
- Number of distinct vehicles in the routing paths of messages in the same cluster
Intrusion-aware trust model Confidence value (Ci)
- Location closeness (Lc)
- Time closeness (Tc)
- Location verification (Lv )
- Time verification (Tv )
Total number of sender nodes (nxk )
Reputation-based trust model Real event frequency (Ef )
Standard frequency of event (Es)
Degree behavior deviation (Dk)
Number of all vehicles sent the message to other vehicles (m, n, k, l)
ERS Event reputation value: indicates the intensity degree of an event
Event confidence value: indicate the reliability extent of an event and the value is the number of
vehicles that received the message
RATE Observation factor (τ )
- Distance from vehicle to event
- Maximum detection range of the vehicle
- Number of sensors that can detect the event
- Total number of sensors equipped in the vehicle
feedback factor (η)
BTM Beacon-based Trust (Tbea)




Direct event-based trust (Tdevt)
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Table 6 Trust metric (Continued)




- Distance between the message receiver and the message transmitter (d)
- Time delay between the event message time-stamp and the receiver’s current time-stamp (t)
- Maximum transmission distance (Dmax)
- Maximum transmission delay (Tmax)
Indirect event-based trust (Tevt)
Recommendation of other vehicles (Topn)
Reputation and trust compositing (Trep)
RaBTM Opinion confidence of RSU (Orsu)
Direct trust value (Tr,sdevt)
- Transmission distance
- Transmission delay
Distance between sender and RSU (Dtot)
Distance between RSU and event (dr,s)
• Experience: refers to the experience of a vehicle on
the event/other vehicles• Rec. by RSU: refers to opinion of RSU on data/entity• Velocity: refers to speed of a vehicle• Vehicle position: refers to the position of a vehicle• Vehicle direction: refers to the direction of a vehicle• Type of event : refers to different events in terms of
safety or non-safety and severity
1.6 Evaluation and comparison of trust models
Development of an appropriate trust model requires a set
of characteristics and parameters that should be taken into
account when designing. These parameters are based on
the challenges in a VANET environment. In [22], several
parameters as requirements of a trust model have been
identified. They mentioned that a suitable trust model
should be accurate, scalable, simple and fast, resilient to
security and privacy threats, and independent of mobil-
ity patterns. Zhang [28] also proposed a set of properties
including decentralization, scalability, sparsity, privacy,
security, confidentiality, dynamics, and robustness, which
are requirements that effective trust management should
take into account. In [32], other features as requirements
of the trust model have been identified. They introduced
anonymity, scalability, decentralization, and dynamics as
requirements of the trust model. They also stated that the
trust model should be able to detect fake locations and
false time-stamps.
In this study, to perform qualitative comparison, we
have selected the following parameters as the trustmodel’s
requirements (Table 8): (i) complexity, (ii) dynamics, (iii)
scalability, (iv) decentralization, (v) security level, and (vi)
privacy.
• Complexity: High mobility is the main feature in a
VANET environment. Therefore, a simple and fast
trust model is required. In this study, to evaluate the
complexity of the trust model, time complexity is
considered as the main factor. Time complexity
refers to the amount of time taken by the trust model
in both the main process (trust measurement) and
pre-process (operations before trust measurement).
Based on these factors, we found TRIP and the
reputation-based trust model as simple and
low-complexity models. In contrast, due to the
operations in pre-processing, RMCV and RATE have
high complexity.
• Dynamics: Rapid change network topology and
different traffic densities are other features in a
VANET environment. The frequent topology change
can cause link breakage, and changes in traffic density
from sparse to heavy and vice versa leads to a negative
impact on information dissemination. Therefore, a
dynamic trust model is needed to deal with these
situations. To this end, independent of mobility
pattern, low dependence on infrastructure and
dynamic trust metric are requirements to develop a
dynamic trust model. We have compared the existing
trust models based on these definitions. The results
of comparisons show that most, but not all, proposed
data-based trust models are completely dynamic and

















Table 7 Summary of trust metrics in the proposed trust model
Metrics
Study Time Distance Rec. by vehicle Rec. by RSU Experience Number of sender Velocity Vehicle position Vehicle direction Type of vehicle Type of event
A multifaceted approach     
TRIP   
On data-centric    
RMCV 
Intrusion-aware trust model   
Reputation-based trust model   
ERS   
RATE 
BTM      
RaBTM       
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Figure 15 Comparison trust metrics based on repetition rate.
words, infrastructure-less trust models are more
dynamic than infrastructure-based ones.
• Scalability: Scalability, as a crucial feature in VANETs,
is the ability of a system to handle the addition of
vehicles or entities without suffering a noticeable loss
in performance or increase in administrative
complexity [39]. Based on this definition, the trust
model should have the same performance in the face
of different network sizes and traffic densities. Due to
the existence of duplicated data/event sent by
vehicles, especially in the high traffic density, most of
the proposed data-based trust models, but not all, are
somewhat scalable. In addition, due to the lack of
necessary infrastructure in all VANETŠs
environment, the trust models that are highly
dependent on RSU cannot be completely scalable.
• Decentralization: Due to the extensive VANET
environment as well as distributed communication in
vehicular ad hoc networks, decentralization is
another requirement in the trust model.
• Security level : In vehicular ad hoc networks, the
accuracy of a message requires authentication of the
sender. In other words, authentication as one of the
security requirements [40] ensures that the message
sent by the sender is valid. Moreover, cryptography as
a technique for secure communication is another
requirement of security. In order to identify the level
of security of the proposed trust models, we review
them in terms of authentication and
encryption/decryption method. The results indicate
the weakness of the trust models in this regard.
• Privacy: The personally identifiable information and
location data are indeed among the most sensitive
data. Because the basis of VANETs is the exchange of
data between entities, data privacy is an important
issue. Therefore, location and data privacy as a
property in the trust model is required.
Based on the trust model requirements mentioned
above, we extracted the properties of the trust models that
Table 8 Qualitative comparison
Metrics
Study Complexity Decentralization Dynamics Scalability Privacy Security level
A multifaceted approach Somewhat simple Y Y SW SW SW
TRIP Simple Y SW SW N N
On data-centric Somewhat simple Y Y SW N SW
RMCV Complex Y Y SW N N
Intrusion-aware trust model Somewhat simple Y Y Y SW N
Reputation-based trust model Simple Y Y SW N SW
ERS Somewhat simple Y Y Y N N
RATE Complex Y SW SW N Y
BTM Somewhat simple Y Y Y Y Y
RaBTM Simple Y SW Y N N
Note: Y, yes; N, no; SW, somewhat.
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Figure 16 Analysis of proposed trust models based on complexity.
were surveyed in the previous section. Table 8 represents
the results of the review. According to these results, we
can conclude that none of the trust models have achieved
all the desired requirements.
For a better understanding of the performance of the
proposed trust models, two diagrams also are provided
based on the complexity and other requirements in
Figure 16 and Figure 17, respectively.
According to the bar graph in Figure 16, 30% of the pro-
posed trust models in this study have low complexity and
20% of them have high complexity. In addition, 50% of the
models are somewhat simple. The bar graph in Figure 17
shows which 70% of trust models have not satisfied pri-
vacy as a requirement. In addition, 50% of the models are
lacking a proper security level.
1.6.1 Fuzzy trust model
According to the previous sections, to design and develop
a new trust model in vehicular ad hoc networks, two
important issues should be considered: (i) properties of
the trust model and (ii) trust metrics. In [38], Wolfson
et al. stated that trust metrics inherit the properties
of trust. Therefore, to determine the appropriate trust
metrics, properties of the trust model must be consid-
ered. Furthermore, trust metrics should be able to satisfy
the trust model’s properties. This interaction is shown in
Figure 18.
Based on the trust model development process as well
as trust model strategies that were discussed previously,
we build our own strategy by taking advantage of the
positive aspects of existing solutions. In the proposed
framework, a fuzzy logic-based method is used based on
the following reasons. First, trust has a fuzzy nature and
it is indefinite or imprecise [41]. Second, trust is a graded
phenomenon that is difficult to estimate experimentally.
Third, the decision on trust is not straightforward because
of its uncertainty. Fuzzy logic provides a natural frame-
work to deal with its uncertainty and the tolerance of
imprecise data inputs. Since the trust value is between
the absolute trust and absolute mistrust, fuzzy techniques
can be effectively used for trust decisions. Tajeddine et al.
[42] stated that fuzzy logic is based on natural language
and it is conceptually easy to understand. Furthermore,
the calculation and measurement of trust in unsupervised
ad hoc environments involve complex aspects such as
credibility rating for opinions delivered by a vehicle, the
Figure 17 Performance of proposed trust models based on requirements.
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Figure 18 Process to develop a trust model.
honesty of recommendations provided by a vehicle, or the
assessment of past experiences with the vehicle one wishes
to interact with. The deployment of suitable algorithms
and models imitating fuzzy logic can help to solve these
problems [15].
In terms of data gathering, there are two existing solu-
tions to get application system input [43]. One is to receive
incoming messages by wireless antenna from RSUs and
other vehicles. The other one is detecting data reported
by sensors. In the proposed framework, to evaluate trust-
worthiness of messages/data, four main modules are
considered: probability of event occurrence module, mis-
behavior detection module, trust measurement module,
and decision making module. As shown in Figure 19,
when a vehicle receives a traffic event by the information
gathering module, based on some factors such as position
of the sender/receiver, time of sending/receipt of data,
time of event occurrence, distance to event, and velocity
of the sender/receiver, the plausibility of data is checked.
To this end, we proposed a misbehavior detection sys-
tem (MDS) module based on fuzzy logic. In this module,
a set of rules is used to represent the inference engine
(knowledge base). Also, we proposed a module based on
fuzzy logic to compute the probability of event occur-
ring called PEO. Given that the probability of an event
largely depends on environmental conditions, this module
computes the probability of an event based on the vehic-
ular environment conditions such as weather, lighting,
type of the event location (urban area, rural area, high-
way, and so on ) and traffic density. This module decides
whether the reported event is probably true or not and
what is the probability of the occurrence of the event.
Then, the trust value of the event is measured by the trust
measurement (TM) module. In this module, to measure
the trust value, several parameters are considered such
as similarity among received data, type of entity, expe-
rience, direction of vehicle movement, plausibility level,
and probability of occurrence of the event. At the end, the
results of previous steps are used in the decision making
module to decide whether the reported event is trustwor-
thy or not. This module is a multi-criteria fuzzy decision
making and works based on the type of event (safety and
non-safety) and level of plausibility of event. Furthermore,
the proposed model addresses the properties of the trust
model discussed in the previous section. In brief, the pro-
posed framework considers various aspects to assess the
trustworthiness of the reported event such as plausibility
and probability. As compared to the existing trust models
in literature, the proposed model not only increases the
accuracy of trust evaluation but also enhances the perfor-
mance of the model in different traffic densities. However,
traditional drawbacks in fuzzy logic methods exist in the
proposed fuzzy logic approach. In addition, having a vari-
ety of locations and events in a vehicular environment,
the definition of a flexible and robust rule is still an open
research issue for fuzzy models in VANETs. The proposed
framework is shown in Figure 19.
2 Conclusions
The trust model enables vehicles to distinguish trustwor-
thy vehicles or messages from untrustworthy ones. It leads
to reducing the risk of vehicles being misguided by other
malicious vehicles. Due to the importance of data and
its quality in VANETs as well as the impact of trust-
worthiness on the quality of applications, this study has
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Figure 19 Our proposal.
conducted a systematic review of current research that
aim at managing trust in vehicular ad hoc networks.
In this review, we have analyzed various studies focusing
on trust models. Based on this analyze, we have extracted
the methods and metrics that are required for design-
ing and managing a trust model. We have concluded
that none of the proposed trust models have achieved all
the desired properties. Therefore, we developed a frame-
work including probability module, plausibility module,
trust measurement module, and decision making mod-
ule. These modules are based on fuzzy logic. In terms
of contributions to the theory, this paper gathers pub-
lished works on trust models and allows researchers to
find possible avenues for future studies in this area.
Looking into the future, development of a lightweight
intelligence trust model for VANETs that satisfies all the
desired properties of a trust model is sensible.
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